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L'auteure dtudie la difficult6 de contester une demande de droit d'6tablissement
en vertu de la Loi sur l'immigration devant la Commission canadienne des droits
de la personne qui d6termine si le demandeur a fait l'objet de discrimination en
vertu de la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne.
"The Immigration Act is replete with provisions which not only permit but
require that adverse differentiation be made in relation to individuals on grounds
of national origin; its provisions also require adverse differentiation on grounds
of age, marital and family status as well as disability. What saves the Commis-
sion the necessity of constantly supervising the Act's administration is the limi-
tation of CHRA s.40(5) [Canadian Human Rights Act] on its authority to deal
with complaints of occurrences outside Canada by persons not entitled to enter
Canada. The [Immigration] Act is about little else than discriminatory practices
and, accepting that the quasi constitutional CHRA is paramount, in circum-
stances where the Commission has jurisdiction to investigate, those discrimina-
tory practices have to be justified as provided in paragraph 15(g)."1
I. INTRODUCTION
When the legislation creating the Canadian Human Rights Commission was
introduced into Parliament in 1977, Minister of Justice, Ron Basford stated that:
* Copyright © 1994, Chantal Tie. Chantal Tie is Executive Director/Lawyer at South
Ottawa Community Legal Services, Ottawa. The author wishes to thank Judith Keene,
author of Human Rights in Ontario (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) for her insights and help-
ful comments on this paper.
1. Anvari v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission, [1993] 19 IMM. L.R.
(2d) 192 at 196.
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these prohibitions against discriminatory conduct will apply to all federal
departments and agencies and any business or industry under federal jurisdic-
tion.2
This principle is specifically set out in the Canadian Human Rights Act as passed
in section 2, which states that the purpose of the Act is to give effect to the
principle
that every individual should have an equal opportunity with other individu-
als to make for himself or herself the life that he or she is able and wishes to
have, consistent with his or her duties and obligations as a member of
society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by dis-
criminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, reli-
gion, age, sex ... 3
Both the stated intention of the legislation and the purpose set out in the
preamble appear at first blush to make the Commission ideally situated to review
the Department of Immigration for discriminatory practices. Indeed, one could
hardly envisage a more compelling denial of opportunity than that of the
immigrant denied entry to Canada on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, age, sex or disability. Further, the Immigration Act itself now
contains non-discrimination provisions in section 3(f) which states that an
immigration objective is
(f) to ensure that any person who seeks admission to Canada on either a perma-
nent or temporary basis is subject to standards of admission that do not discrimi-
nate in a manner inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms;4
The Charter guarantees rights of equality, specifically prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, ethnic or national origin, colour, religion etc. Any
infringement of these guarantees will be rendered unlawful unless the Canadian
Government can justify it under section 1.5 The inclusion of these rights
illustrates, at least officially, a Government commitment for the Immigration
Department, to the same non-discrimination principles underlying the Canadian
Human Rights Act.
Canadian immigration policies were, from the turn of the century until the mid
1960's, based on an overt preference for northern European immigrants. This
2. House of Commons Debates (11 February 1977) at 2976.
3. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s.2. [hereinafter CHRA]
4. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2.
5. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982 being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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preference was reflected in both the policies and the delivery system which
evolved to actively recruit immigrants from northern Europe, and to control
immigration from other parts of the world. Given this recent history, it is
essential to have at hand the tools to assess the Department for discriminatory
practices. This is particularly so, in light of the degree of discretion which is still
vested in the Minister and the Department, and the potential for the abuse of that
discretion in a discriminatory manner.
The very process of immigration involves the selection of one immigrant over
another, all from a pool of ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse peoples.
The pool of candidates has members of the historically dominant cultural groups
in Canada, namely the British and the French, with whom the Department's
employees would naturally identify and sympathize. 6 Indeed, it would be naive
to assume that some favouritism would not be present.
Notwithstanding the Department's commitment to principles of non-discrimi-
nation enunciated in section 2 of the Immigration Act, it is clearly essential to
the process that the task of ensuring that those principles are respected be vested
with some outside agency, such as the Commission. Despite its long delays, one
would expect the Human Rights Commission to be ideally suited for the job. It
is independent, accessible, inexpensive to the complainant and has the power to
conduct comprehensive self-initiated reviews with a view to remedying prob-
lems of systemic discrimination.
II. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CHRA
The Canadian Human Rights Act seeks to ensure that individuals have access
to equal opportunities in Canadian society, without regard to race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion and disability.7 Equality of opportunity is ensured
by prohibiting discrimination in the provision of goods, services, accommoda-
tion and facilities that are within federal jurisdiction.
Section 5 of the CHRA provides that:
It is a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods, services, facilities or
accommodation customarily available to the general public,
6. The Canadian Ethnocultural Council analyzed visible minority representation in the
management of the Department of Employment & Immigration for the years 1990 and
1991 and determined that the number of management persons who were visible minori-
ties was so small that they had to be suppressed to maintain the confidentiality of the
individuals. Overall, in management and non-management positions visible minorities
represented only 2.4% of the employees. Canadian Ethnocultural Council, Employment
Inequity, (Ottawa:Canadian Ethnocultural Council, (1992)) at Table 3-1 and Table 2-3.
7. Supra note 3, s.2.
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(a) to deny, or to deny access to, any such goods, service, facility or
accommodation to any individual, or,
(b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any individual, on a prohibi-
tive ground of discrimination.
The prohibited grounds of discrimination are enumerated in section 3 (1) of the
CHRA:
For all purposes of this Act, race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age,
sex, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon
has been granted are prohibited grounds of discrimination.
Immigration clearly comes under the federal parliamentary jurisdiction. Section
95 of the British North American Act 8 grants concurrent federal and provincial
jurisdiction over immigration, so that the activities of the Department should be
subject to review under the Canadian Human Rights Act.
Section 40(5)(a-c) of the CHRA, however, imposes important restrictions on the
Commission's jurisdiction; restrictions which relate to the character of the
complainant and the locus of the discriminatory practice. These restrictions
operate to severely limit jurisdiction in many immigration cases.
(5) No complaint in relation to a discriminatory practice may be dealt with by
the Commission under this Part unless the act or omission that constitutes the
practice
(a) occurred in Canada and the victim of the practice was at the time of
the act or omission either lawfully present in Canada or, if temporarily
absent from Canada, entitled to return to Canada;
(b) occurred in Canada and was a discriminatory practice within the
meaning of section 8, 10, 12 or 13 in respect of which no particular indi-
vidual is identifiable as the victim; or
(c) occurred outside Canada and the victim of the practice was at the time
of the act or omission a Canadian citizen or an individual lawfully admit-
ted to Canada for permanent residence.
By their very nature, the bulk of immigration services are services delivered
outside Canada, to people who are not citizens, and who may have no connection
to Canada other than their application for admission. Indeed, it would appear
that by section 40(5), the government may have insulated from review by the
Commission the Department's main activity of immigrant selection. Indeed, this
is the position that the Department itself has systematically adopted, casting the
section 40 exclusions in the widest possible terms.
8. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict.
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III. GENERAL SCHEME OF THE CHRA
The CHRA provides that any individual or group of individuals may file a
complaint with the Commission if they have reasonable grounds for believing
that a person is engaging in a discriminatory practice. 9 The Commission also
has the jurisdiction to investigate on its own initiative if they have reasonable
grounds to believe that discrimination is being practised. 10
Once a complaint has been lodged, the Commission has the power to appoint
an "investigator" who has powers of search and seizure under section 43. If the
investigator's report indicates that the complaint is founded, and no grounds for
dismissal exist pursuant to section 41(c-e), the Commission refers the case for
the appointment of a Human Rights Tribunal which will enquire into the
complaint.1 1 The process therefore involves a two-step process; complaint,
investigation and assessment and; secondly, the possibility of a tribunal hearing
itself.
IV. JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE
From the onset, the Department of Immigration has taken the position that in
addition to the exclusionary provisions of section 40(5)(a-c), the Commission's
jurisdiction was further limited by the wording of section 5 of the CHRA. The
Department argued that it was not engaged in the "provision of... services ...
customarily available to the general public" within the meaning of section 5.
In 1977, a group of Jamaican domestic workers initiated a series of complaints
alleging that they were being discriminated against because of their race. They
alleged that black women had been singled out for deportation because they had
failed to disclose the existence of dependent children when they applied for
entry. Part of their evidence included internal departmental memoranda which
purportedly illustrated the discrimination. The complainants brought an appli-
cation for an injunction in the Trial Division of the Federal Court, in an attempt
to restrain the Minister of Immigration from executing deportation orders
against them, until the Human Rights complaints had been dealt with. The
application was dismissed, and on appeal to the Court of Appeal, Mr. Justice Le
Dain, speaking for the Court, said
Having concluded for these reasons that an injunction will not lie for a purpose
such as that invoked in the present case, I do not find it necessary to express an
opinion as to whether the application of the inquiry and deportation provisions
9. Supra note 3, s.40(l).
10. Ibid. at s.40(3).
11. Ibid. at s.44(l)(a).
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of the Immigration Act is a service customarily available to the general public
within the meaning of section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The ques-
tion as to the extent, if any, to which the administration and application of fed-
eral statutes, whether regulatory in purpose or not, fall under the Canadian
Human Rights Act is, of course, a serious one. There may be important distinc-
tions to be drawn between different aspects of the public service, based on the
facts established in each case. It is preferable, I think, that these questions
should be determined in the first instance by the Commission, as section 33
would appear to intend, before a court is called upon to pronounce upon them. 12
Despite these obiter comments on Commission jurisdiction by Mr. Justice Le
Dain, the failure to grant the injunction left the Department free to deport the
applicants and none of the Human Rights applications proceeded.' 3
Lodge clearly did not resolve the jurisdictional dilemma, but the statement by
the Court that some services could conceivably be subject to review, while others
might not be, resulted in further ambiguity about the Commission's powers over
immigration. However, despite what appeared to be a clear directive from the
Court as to who determines jurisdiction in the first instance, the Department
took the position that the Commission did not have the power to embark on even
the investigative stage of the process, let alone to proceed to determine its own
jurisdiction.
In the ensuing ten years, the Department prevented the Commission from
investigating immigration complaints by refusing to cooperate. By 1988, there
were ten outstanding complaints concerning immigration practices, brought by
five different complainants. The Department had stymied all investigations and
all ten cases were referred to the Federal Court (Trial Division) by way of a
reference, Re Singh, in an attempt to settle the question of the Commission's
jurisdiction over the initial investigative stage of immigration complaints. 14
In Re Singh the Department continued to argue the section 40(1) exclusions of
the CHRA, and that section 5 limited the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction.
Further, they argued that the Commission was not competent to determine its
own jurisdiction because the complaints were clearly outside the Commission's
jurisdiction, barring the Commission from embarking on even preliminary
investigations of complaints.
12. Lodge v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1979] 1 F.C. 775 at 785 [hereinaf-
ter Lodge].
13. Information obtained from discussions with the Canadian Human Rights Commission.
14. Re Singh, [1989] F.C.J. No. 414 (Q.L.).
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In all ten of the cases the complainants were either Canadian citizens or
permanent residents of Canada. The harm alleged was the failure to grant
visitors' visas to close family relatives and alleged discrimination on prohibited
grounds resulting from the refusal by the Department to permit sponsorship for
an immigrant visa to close relatives as "members of the family class". 15
In determining the questions in Re Singh,16 the Court found as a preliminary
matter that the Commission clearly had the jurisdiction to enquire into the limits
of its own jurisdiction.
An examination of the Canadian Human Rights Act makes it clear that the Com-
mission is a body whose jurisdiction to enquire includes the jurisdiction to
enquire into the limits of its own jurisdiction. The initial jurisdiction of the
Commission is triggered by the filing of a complaint; once that happens, the
Commission is required by the mandatory words of section 33 to deal with it
("the Commission shall deal"). The question of jurisdiction is specifically dealt
with in subparagraph 33(b)(ii), in a manner that makes evident Parliament's
intent that the Commission itself should in the first instance decide if a matter is
within its jurisdiction.
Having established this preliminary point, the Court went on to phrase the
question of the reference very simply as,
whether the complaints cannot possibly relate to discriminatory practices in the
provision of services customarily available to the general public and whether the
complainants could not possibly be described as victims of the alleged discrimi-
natory practices.
The Federal Court considered the broad scope and intent of the CHRA to
determine how liberally it should be interpreted. After reviewing section 2 of
the Act which sets out its purpose, the Court found that it is
cast in wide terms and that both its subject and its stated purpose suggest that it
is not to be interpreted narrowly or restrictively 17
Having established the broad terms of reference, the Court proceeded to deal
with the two arguments raised by Immigration to determine if the facts could
conceivably lead to a finding of discrimination. The first threshold issue was
that immigration services, those concerned with the granting of landed immigr-
ant and visitor's visas could not be "services ... customarily available to the
general public". In deciding this question, the Court stated
15. Immigration Act, supra note 4, s.2(l).
16. Supra note 14.
17. Canada (A.G.) v. Cummings, [1980] 2 F.C. 122 at 131.
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that, by definition, services rendered by public servants at public expense are
services to the public and therefore fall within the ambit of Section 5.18
While Mr. Justice Hugessen made it clear that he was not making a final
determination on the question of services rendered in Canada and abroad by
Immigration, it is clear that he was not convinced that such services were not
"services customarily available to the general public"
The second argument was that the complainants, who were all Canadian citizens
or permanent residents, were not the "true victims" of the alleged discriminatory
practice. The "true victims" were those who had applied for visas and been
refused, and all of these people were excluded by section 32(5)(b) [now section
40(5)(c)] of the CHRA because the refusal occurred outside Canada and they
were neither Canadian citizens nor people who had been lawfully admitted to
Canada for permanent residence.
In rejecting this argument, the Court found that there could conceivably be
several "victims" of a discriminatory practice, even extending to those who are
unintended victims. Relying heavily on the stated objectives of the Immigration
Act, including the reunification of families, and the facilitation of the entry of
visitors, 19 the Court found that the Canadian family members, denied the
company of their relatives as either visitors or landed immigrants, could have
standing as "victims", and could therefore initiate complaints. The Court in Re
Singh did not make any specific findings of fact in the ten cases on reference
but only stated that there could conceivably be discrimination, the determination
being left to the Commission after a full review of the facts.
Having cleared the preliminary hurdle of the Commission's jurisdiction to
investigate, the Court opened the door to the determination of substantive
immigration issues by the Commission twelve years after its formation. With
the referral by the Commission of a number of cases to the Human Rights
Tribunal following Re Singh, the important issues in immigration complaints
are now emerging. Unfortunately, the question of the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission continues to pose the single most important obstacle to a comprehensive
and effective anti-discrimination review.
A. Service "Customarily Available to the General Public"
The interpretation of offered to the public' ... should be as follows: any service
offered by a government is a service offered to the public. This interpretation
18. Re Singh, supra note 14, at 23.
19. Supra note 4, s.3(3).
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furthers the policy of the Code of eliminating discrimination, for all government
services would be covered. It is also consonant with the overall expansive scope
of the Code ... A government by its nature has only public relationships with
persons... 20
In 1984 Mehran Anvari filed a complaint alleging discrimination on the basis
of physical disability in his application for "landing" under the IRAN pro-
gramme. The Immigration Department took the position that the IRAN pro-
gramme was a special, one-time policy created by Order-in-Council for the
purpose of landing Iranians who had established themselves in Canada. As such,
they argued that it was an "individualistic" service, and not a service "custom-
arily available to the public". The Department argued that because only Iranians,
a specific and special group, were eligible to apply under the IRAN program,
the service was not one which was available to members of the general public.
This narrow interpretation of "public" was a position which received some
currency during the late 1980's, and its application to deny jurisdiction to the
Commission was not limited to the area of Immigration law.2'
At first instance, the Human Rights Tribunal found that:
The Immigration Act, an Act of the Parliament of Canada, has general scope to
provide a service to the public; under this Act and its Regulations, the officials
involved in the processing of individuals towards "landed immigrant" status
carry out an official duty as agents of the Crown. Thus, each official is provid-
ing a service to the public.22
On review at the Human Rights Review Tribunal this interpretation was upheld,
The present Tribunal is of the opinion that the Canada Employment and
Immigration Commission derives its authority from an Act passed by the Parlia-
ment of Canada. The Scope of this Act is general and whenever the Government
of Canada applies an Act of general scope, it is providing a service to the public.
The Canada Employment and Immigration Commission was carrying out its
official duty as an agent of the Crown and thus was providing a service to the
public. 23
20. D. Greschner, "Why Chambers is Wrong: A Purposive Interpretation of 'Offered to the
Public' (1986) Sask. L. Rev. 161
21. See Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission and Chambers v. Gov't of Sask., Depart-
ment of Social Services (15 July, 1987), Saskatoon 1573 (Sask. Q.B.) and Greschner,
ibid.
22. Anvari v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1988], T.D. 18/88
(C.H.R.C). 13; 10 C.H.R.R. D/5816, at 5822.
23. Anvari v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] C.H.R.D. No. 2;
14 C.H.R.R. D/292 at 296.
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This very broad interpretation of "public", which appears to encompass almost
any public activity was affirmed by the Federal Court in Rosin in 1991.
In order for a service or facility to be publicly available, it is not required that all the
members of the public have access to it. It is enough for a segment of the public to
be able to avail themselves of the service or facility. Requiring that certain qualifica-
tions or conditions be met does not rob an activity of its public character. The cases
have shown that "public" means "that which is not private", leaving outside the
scope of the legislation very few activities indeed. 24
The narrow quantitative approach to "public" was finally laid to rest by the
Supreme Court in 1993 when Mr. Justice Lamer, speaking for the Court, held
that:
It appears to me that attention in prior cases to the quantitative characteristics of
the group to whom the service or facility is available does not focus adequately
on other relevant factors. If the focus is purely quantitative, it is indeed hard to
see how anything less than all citizens can be said to be the "public" of a given
municipality, province or country. 25
Every service has its own public and once that "public" has been defined
through the use of eligibility criteria the Act prohibits discrimination within that
public. 26
1. Can "Public" Extend to People Outside Canada?
The activities involved in providing immigrant and visitor visas are, for the most
part, activities which are conducted outside Canada at overseas visa offices, and
the recipients of the services are exclusively people who have no independant
right to enter Canada. In Naqvi27 an argument was made by the Department that,
in order not to give extraterritorial application to the Canadian Human Rights
Act, "the public" in section 5 oftheAct, must be limited to the Canadian "public"
only. Such an interpretation would have excluded from review all of the
activities of visa officers overseas. In adopting a broad, objectively based
interpretation of the Act, the Tribunal in Naqvi did not specifically deal with the
"extraterritorial" argument, but found that:
Foreign service officers posted in other countries are representatives of Canada. There
is no reason why the principles of the CHRA should not apply to their activities.
28
24. Canada (A.G.) v. Rosin, [1991] F.C. 391 at 398.
25. University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2. S.C.R. 353. (QL) at 57.
26. Ibid. at 59.
27. Naqvi v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1993] C.H.R.D. No.2
(QL) at 83. [hereinafter Naqvi] (Judicial Review Application to Federal Court com-
menced but not yet determined).
28. Ibid. at 67.
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It is not clear why the "extraterritorial" argument was rejected, but the issue
does raise some important questions that should have been addressed, if for no
other reason than to discredit them once and for all.
In Naqvi the Department argued that the territorial principle of International law
assumes that statutes have no extraterritorial application. 29 Support for the
extraterritorial principle is set out in The People v. Tyler:
... It is well settled, as a general principle, that the laws of no nation can have
extraterritorial force-that criminal laws especially cannot operate beyond the
territorial limits of the government by which they are enacted. 30
The flaws in the analogy are obvious, and perhaps for that reason did not merit
more than a passing reference in the decision. The Canadian Human Rights Act
is remedial, not punitive legislation, whose object is the elimination of discrimina-
tion within the legislative authority of the Federal parliament.3 1 The investigation
of human rights complaints involves an examination of the policies and practices
of the Canadian Immigration Department, and their employees. Any remedial
action ordered would be against the Canadian government or its agents, not against
the non-national complainants. Nobody argues that Canadian visa officers operat-
ing abroad are operating without jurisdiction because of extraterritorial considera-
tions when applying Canadian Immigration Laws. Why then, should extraterritorial
considerations arise when we seek to review their decisions under human rights
legislation?
If we make an analogy with the Criminal law, the "accused" would be the Federal
Department, and the "victims" would be the non-national complainants. Princi-
ples of territorial jurisdiction in international law hold that states can exercise
jurisdiction if either the crime is committed or the criminal is resident within
the national territory. 32 A strong argument can be made that the "crime" of
discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act is one which is committed
by the Canadian government which is, by definition, resident within Canada.
Further, given the remedial, not punitive purposes of the legislation, there are
no public policy reasons preventing the application of the Canadian Human
Rights Act in situations that involve non-nationals residing outside Canada. The
only conceivable results of any Commission inquiry would be to either preserve
the status quo for the complainants, or to place them in a better position. As the
29. Ibid. at 66.
30. (1857), 7 Mich. 160 at 220.
31. Supra note 3, s.2.
32. R. v. Godfrey, [1923] 1 K.B. 24.
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objects of scrutiny are exclusively Canadian government practices, policies and
personnel, and any remedial orders are made exclusively against them, it is hard
to imagine that any foreign state could object to jurisdiction as an infringement
of their territorial sovereignty.
Further, in areas of law related to immigration, there are examples of the
extraterritorial application of statutes. In the Criminal Code,33 Canada has taken
jurisdiction over offenses of passport forgery and uttering committed outside
Canada. Proceedings can be commenced in any territory within Canada, even
when the offender is outside Canada, and the offence was committed outside
Canada. The Immigration Act 34 gives Canada the power to turn away vessels
transporting illegal immigrants, when they are in the internal waters of Canada,
the territorial seas, or twelve miles beyond the outer limit of the territorial
waters. Similarly, we have the power under the Citizenship Act to prosecute
offenses which are committed outside Canada, once the offender is within
Canada, if the act or omission would have been an offence had it actually been
committed here. 3 5
B. Who can be a Complainant
In Menghani,36 one of the cases involved in Re Singh, the complainant had
completed a job offer for his brother, who was seeking admission under the
"Family Business-Job Offer to Relatives" category. This class, unlike family
class applications, does not require a formal sponsorship. The requirements of
the category, however, were such that the relative had to be destined to work in
the family business in a position of trust for which he or she was qualified.
When Menghani reached the Tribunal level in 1991, the Department again
argued that the complainant was not a victim, despite the strong wording in Re
Singh. Because the reasoning in Re Singh was based on an analysis of the
interests and obligations of sponsors, the Department sought to distinguish
Menghani by arguing that the complainant was not a true "sponsor" under the
Immigration Act.37
33. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.57(6).
34. Supra, note 4, s. 90. 1(1).
35. Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, s.30(l).
36. Infra note 38.
37. During the hearing in Re Singh, Menghani had been classified as a sponsorship case
based on allegations contained in the original complaint form, despite the fact that no
actual sponsorship under Section 79 of the Immigration Act had been required.
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The Department took the position that the complainant must be a "direct" victim
of discrimination, and that the only direct victim in the case was the visa
applicant himself, who was obviously not a Canadian citizen or Permanent
Resident, and therefore excluded from making a complaint under section 40 of
the CHRA. In rejecting this argument, the Tribunal cast the test in broader terms:
It would include anyone in Canada who suffers consequences which are suffi-
ciently direct and immediate.
The Tribunal then set out guidelines for determining whether consequences are
sufficiently direct and immediate to warrant inclusion as follows:
I. Degree of consanguinity of the Canadian relative to the prospective immigrant.
2. The dependency (financial, emotional) of the Canadian relative on the prospec-
tive immigrant;
3. Deprivation of significant commercial or cultural opportunities to the Canadian
relative by the absence of the prospective immigrant;
4. The historical closeness of the relationship between the two persons;
5. The degree of involvement of the Canadian relative in supporting the applica-
tion for immigration under the Immigration Act and Regulations.
38
Using the test set out, the Tribunal found on the facts that there was a long
standing and close financial and economic relationship between the brothers
sufficient to qualify the complainant as a victim.
What is interesting about the guidelines is that, despite the broad wording of the
preliminary statement, they appear to assume that only relatives can qualify as
victims. It remains to be seen if the list will be invoked only in cases where the
relatives are victims, or as a rationale for excluding other categories of victims,
such as potential employers who have made job offers to prospective independ-
ant immigrants.
The Federal Court, on a judicial review of the Review Tribunal decision in
Menghani, approved the Review Tribunal decision, and found that third parties can
be injured parties and therefore "victims" with standing to bring complaints. The
Court appears to adopt the list developed by the Tribunal, going as far as to state
that on the facts of Menghani the status of "victim" was established. 39
38. Menghani v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1992] C.H.R.D
No.4 (QL) at 42.
39. Canada (Secretary of State for External Affairs) v. Menghani, [1993] F.C.J. No. 1287
(QL) at 41 [hereinafter Menghani].
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The reasoning in Menghani was adopted by the Tribunal in Naqvi, with the
added observation that when assessing direct and immediate injury, one can take
into account characteristics of the complainant which would lead him or her to
identify with the other victim.
The affront to the dignity of the Complainants must be regarded as more severe
where many of the personal characteristics which comprise the grounds of the
discriminatory practice are shared by the Complainants- i.e. race, national and
ethnic origin and gender (Mrs. Naqvi). 40
Since the decisions in Naqvi and Menghani, this broad definition of "Complain-
ant" appears to have been generally accepted by the Courts. In one of the several
cases involving allegations of anti-semitic behaviour against New Brunswick
school teacher Malcom Ross, Mr. Justice Stratton, of the New Brunswick Court
of Appeal found that the parent of a Jewish child in the same school district,
who had had no direct contact with Malcom Ross, had the status of complainant
under the New Brunswick Human Rights Act. Mr. Justice Stratton quoted with
approval from Re Singh:
The question as to who is the 'victim' of an alleged discriminatory practice is
almost wholly one of fact. Human rights legislation does not look so much to
the intent of discriminatory practices as to their effect ... That effect is by no
means limited to the alleged 'target' of the discrimination and it is entirely con-
ceivable that a discriminatory practice may have consequences which are suffi-
ciently direct and immediate to justify qualifying as a 'victim' thereof persons
who were never within the contemplation or intent of its author.4 1
C. Sections 40(5)(a-c) and the Charter
Sections 40(5)(a-c) of the Canadian Human Rights Act serve to limit the
jurisdiction of the Commission directly, by denying jurisdiction in cases where
the discrimination occurred in Canada, but the person was not lawfully present
here, or where the events occurred outside Canada and the victim was not
either a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident. 4 2 While the Commission,
Tribunals and Courts have skirted around the issue of jurisdiction, none has
grappled with a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the provision itself
under the Charter. In respect of matters other than immigration, courts have
accepted that human rights legislation must itself conform to section 15 of the
Charter, and have struck down provisions that offended section 15.
43
40. Supra note 27 at 83.
41. Board of Education of District No. 15 v. Human Rights Board of Inquiry (N.B.), [1989]
N.B.J. No. 844 p. 33 .
42. Supra note 3.
43. See for example Blainey v. Ontario Hockey Association, 54 O.R.(2d) 513 (C.A.), leave
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Clearly, the CHRA makes a distinction between those lawfully present in Canada
and those who are not, and limits jurisdiction abroad to complainants who are
Canadians and Permanent Residents. Madame Justice Wilson, speaking for the
Supreme Court, has held that the Charter applies to "every human being who is
physically present in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian
law".4 4 Therefore by extension a good argument could and should be made that
the equality guarantees under section 15 should apply to prohibit the discrimi-
nation inherent in section 40(5)(a) of the CHRA. All persons physically present
in Canada have a right to equal treatment and benefit of the law under the
Charter. Denying human rights legislation protection to those who are not
lawfully present here would constitute unequal treatment.
The Charter is also supposed to apply to all activities of the Canadian govern-
ment, which arguably should include visa officer decisions. The failure to
provide human rights protection to those who are neither Canadians nor perma-
nent residents, but who are nonetheless discriminated against by Canadian visa
officers abroad should be open to Charter challenge. The Federal Court of
Appeal in Ruparel 4 5has found that the Charter does not apply to visa officer
decisions, however a strong case has been made that Ruparel was wrongly
decided. 4 6
V. DIRECT AND ADVERSE EFFECT DISCRIMINATION
IN IMMIGRATION
A. Direct Discrimination on the Basis of Ethnic Origin and
Marital Status.
Where visas are denied based on assumptions made about characteristics or
tendencies of people on any of the prohibited grounds, such as "single women
of Pakistani origin" this has been held to constitute prima facie evidence of
discrimination.
to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 274 (S.C.C.).
44. Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigraton, [ 1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at 202 [herein-
after Singh].
45. Ruparel v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),[1990] F.C.J. No. 701
(QL) [hereinafter Ruparel].
46. For a comprehensive argument as to why this decision is wrong, see D. Galloway, "The
Extraterritorial Application of the Charter of Rights to Visa Applicants" (1991) 23
Ottawa L.Rev.335 [1991] I.T.T.L. (QL) 16.
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Ms Naqvi applied for a visitor's visa in order to visit her sister in Canada. She
was refused because she had not applied in her home country and the visa officer
found that she "would stay illegally in the country and get married there". 47 This
latter justification for the visa refusal could only have been based on general-
izations made by the visa officer concerning Ms Naqvi's race, sex and national
origin, because Ms Naqvi herself was never interviewed. The Tribunal found
that in order to justify the discrimination the following factors had to be
considered:
A bona fide justification requires consideration of both subjective and objective
factors. We have no doubt that at least some immigration authorities hold an
honest and sincere belief that the marital status of young persons, particularly
women from Pakistan, are relevant factors in determining the bona fides of
intention to be a visitor. However, this must be true from an objective standpoint
as well in order to justify refusal of a visa. It is the finding of this Tribunal that
there has been no objective evidence of bona fide justification. 48
Clearly, without an interview, the visa officer could not have assessed what Ms
Naqvi's true intentions were in coming to Canada, and the Tribunal found that
the subjective belief of the visa officer, concerning her intentions, was unsup-
ported by the required objective evidence.
B. Direct Discrimination on the basis of disability
Until recent amendments are proclaimed, the Immigration Act discriminates
directly against applicants for admission on the basis of disability in section
19(l)(a)(ii). 49 Applicants "suffering from any disease, disorder, disability or
other health impairment" are treated differently from and more harshly than
other applicants. People who fall into these categories are required to satisfy
Immigration that "their admission would not cause or might reasonably be
expected to cause excessive demands on health or social services;" 50
47. Naqvi, supra note 27 at 38.
48. Ibid. at 78.
49. Recent amendments removed the direct reference to persons suffering from disease,
disorder, disability or other health impairment. The new section, which is not in force at
date of publication reads:
(a) persons who in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by at least one other
medical officer, are persons
(i) who, for medical reasons, are or are likely to be a danger to public health or to public
safety, or
(ii) whose admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive
demands, within the meaning assigned to that expression by the regulations, on health
or prescribed social services; [1992], c.49, s. 10.
50. ARCH (Advocacy Resource Centre for the Handicapped) has commenced a Charter
challenge to sections 19(l)(a) and (c) by way of Statement of Claim for damages in
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In 1983, Mehran Anvari was refused landing in Canada pursuant to this section
on the basis of his physical disability. Anvari was born in Iran, where he
contracted poliomyelitis as a young child. His disability was later compounded by
scoliosis, which together left him with only one partially functional leg, and
curvature of the spine. In 1983 a special program was announced in the wake of the
Iranian revolution which permitted Iranians to apply for landing from within
Canada. Anvari was employed full time and was self-supporting when he applied
under the program. Despite this, he was refused admission by reason of 19(1)(a)(ii)
of theImmigration Act which reads as follows:
19.(1) No person shall be granted admission if he is a member of any of the fol-
lowing classes;
(a) persons who are suffering from any disease, disorder, disability or other
health impairment as a result of the nature, severity or probable duration of
which, in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by at least one other
medical officer, ...
(ii) their admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause
excessive demands on health or social services; ...
Anvari argued that the Department discriminated against him on the basis of his
disability, and he succeeded at both the Tribunal and the Review Tribunal. The
Department, however, successfully sought judicial review in the Federal Court,
where Anvari was unrepresented.
Both the Tribunal and the Review Tribunal found as a fact that there was direct
discrimination against the Complainant on the basis of his disability. Both
tribunals then proceeded to determine if the discrimination was justified under
section 15(g) of the CHRA which reads as follows:
15. It is not a discriminatory practice if
(g) in the circumstances described in section 5 or 6, an individual is denied any
goods, services, ... or is a victim of any adverse differentiation and there is bona
fide justification for that denial or differentiation. 51
The Tribunal found that under section 19(l)(a) of the Immigration Act, the bona
fide justification was not found in the section itself, but in the various opinions
of the medical officers which the section mandated. Using this approach, every
case would be examined on its facts to determine if applicants had been properly
included in the section.
Mussa v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) Ontario Court (General
Division) Court File No. 93-00-45153 and anticipates challenging the amended section
19(l)(a) under the Charter when it is proclaimed.
51. Supra note 3.
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This discrimination decision was made, based upon s.19(l)(a) of the Immigration
Act; presumably, that section of the Immigration Act outlines the basis for the bona
fide justification for the adverse differentiation which it also creates. 52
On Judicial Review in the Federal Court, Mr. Justice Mahoney overturned the
Review Tribunal decision. 53 The Court found that the section itself created a
bona fide justification for the discrimination. Further, that in cases of direct
discrimination there was no requirement to enquire into the reasonableness of
the complainant's inclusion in that category:
With respect, it was wrong in law in finding that there was jurisdiction under the
CHRA to decide that the discriminatory practice mandated by the provision is
not bona fide justified unless it is demonstrated that it has been applied in a rea-
sonable fashion or that its application is justified in the particular case. For juris-
diction to arise under the CHRA, the provision must have been applied in a
discriminatory fashion. Unless a prima facie case of a discriminatory practice on
the part of the medical officers in reaching their opinion were established, there
was no onus on them to show that their opinion was bona fide justified.54
The Court hints that this question is more appropriately posed in a different
forum, supposedly a judicial review of the decision that the complainant falls
within 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Immigration Act:
It may have been reached wrongly as a matter of law or it may have been
reached in the teeth of the evidence and, if it was, a remedy exists elsewhere
but, unless a discriminatory practice is established in the application of subsec-
tion 19(l)(a), no remedy exists under the CHRA. 55
While Mr. Justice Mahoney's decision has other analytical problems, the rationale
for his decision is not well articulated, nor is it obvious. What is most startling about
the Anvari decision, however, is that while it acknowledges the "paramountcy" of
the CHRA, it seems to find that the mere existence of section 19 constitutes a bona
fide justification under section 15 of the CHRA. Mr. Justice Mahoney deals with
the issue in the most cursory manner possible, finding justification without exam-
ining the evidence or the rationale that was before the Tribunal:
While counsel for the Commission was disposed to cavil at the proposition, it
seems clear to me that the Tribunal and Review Tribunal accepted that subpara.
19(l)(a)(ii) mandates an otherwise discriminatory practice which is bona fide
justified. That was correct in law.56
52. Anvari supra note 22.
53. Anvari, supra note 1.
54. Ibid. at 198.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
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This approach is not in accord with the law that has developed in cases where
a practice mandated or permitted by statute is challenged under human rights
law. If a statutory practice offends human rights legislation, there are two.
available arguments. Firstly, the legislative provision itself can be overridden
by the human rights legislation, or secondly, the statutory practice must be
performed in a way which does not conflict with human rights legislation.
It appears that the Tribunal took the second approach, although they did not
clearly say so. By looking for the bonafide justification in the medical opinions
filed in the case, the Tribunal, in effect, reviewed the Department's actions in
light of the law on "bonafide justification" under section 15 of the CHRA.
It is suggested that in Anvari either approach would have been appropriate. The
Federal Court could have quite properly overridden the section in its entirety,
or sought to apply it in a manner which did not offend the CHRA. Unfortunately
the Court did neither.
1. The Override Argument
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly emphasized the special nature of
human rights legislation, casting it as "quasi-constitutional" 57 and granting it
clear paramountcy when in conflict with other legislation.
When the subject matter of a law is said to be the comprehensive statement of
the "human rights" of the people living in that jurisdiction, then there is no
doubt in my mind that the people of that jurisdiction have through their legisla-
ture clearly indicated that they consider that law, and the values it endeavours to
buttress and protect, are, save their constitutional laws, more important than all
others. Therefore, short of the legislature speaking to the contrary in express and
unequivocal language in the Code or in some other enactment, it is intended that
the Code supersede all other laws when conflict arises.
As a result, the legal propositiongeneralis specialibus non derogant cannot be
applied to such a code. Indeed the Human Rights Code, when in conflict with
"particular or specific legislation" is not to be treated as another ordinary law of
general application. It should be recognized for what it is, a fundamental law.58
It is argued that section 19(1)(a) of the ImmigrationAct is clearly discriminatory,
and that the Department's and the Court's reliance upon the statutory enactment
itself, cannot provide a bonafide justification. The mere fact that the legislature
has authorized a discriminatory practice does not isolate that practice from a
Human Rights review, because of the paramountcy of human rights legislation.
57. Singh, supra note 44, 224.
58. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 158.
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Nowhere in the Immigration Act are any other groups singled out for possible
exclusion on these grounds. For instance, applicants with other risky lifestyles
or who have made risky occupational choices which have been shown to
increase the risks of injury or debilitating disease are not screened. Immigration
does not screen for smokers, firefighters, hockey players, boxers or accident
prone drivers, and require them to prove that they will not place excessive
demands on health or social services in the future. Neither do they screen other
applicants, for instance the intellectually gifted, who might well take advantage
of special gifted programs, loans, bursaries or subsidized academic studies at
universities during their lifetime. Arguably, all of these applicants could well
place additional demands on Canadian services, either as a result of their unique
abilities, or because they are engaged in some risky behaviour or occupation.
It is argued that Immigration discriminates against disabled people simply by
applying section 19(1)(a), irrespective of the manner in which is it applied. By
singling out people with disabilities, and then narrowly focusing on the health
and social services aspect of government expenditures, without any assessment
of an applicant's potential contribution to Canadian society, disabled applicants,
as a class, have been discriminated against contrary to the CHRA.
2. Bonafide Justification and Applying the law in Accordance
with the CHRA.
Not only did the Court in Anvari fail to consider any question of the legitimacy
of section 19(1)(a) of the Immigration Act itself, but it also failed to properly
apply the law once it had accepted that discrimination did exist. The Supreme
Court has set out a procedure for analyzing discrimination, which essentially
involves a two step process. The complainant has to establish aprimafacie case
of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the respondent to show that the
discrimination is justified under section 40 (g). This procedure was outlined in
detail in Etobicoke:
Once a complainant has established before a board of inquiry a prima facie case
of discrimination, in this case proof of a mandatory retirement at age sixty as a
condition of employment, he is entitled to relief in the absence of justification
by the employer. The only justification which can avail the employer in the case
at bar, is the proof, the burden of which lies upon him, that such compulsory
retirement is a bona fide occupational qualification and requirement for the
employment concerned. The proof, in my view, must be made according to the
ordinary civil standard of proof, that is upon a balance of probabilities. 59
59. Ontario Human Rights Commission v. The Borough of Etobicoke, [1982] 3 C.H.R.R.
Decision 164, at D/783. (S.C.C.). [hereinafter Etobicoke].
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The term "bonafide" is used frequently in human rights legislation and has been
the subject of considerable judicial comment. The Federal Court of Appeal has
said that "bonafide justification" conveys the same meaning as the words "bona
fide occupational requirement" and "bonafide occupational qualification", both
of which are used in other parts of the CHRA. The only difference is that "bona
fide justification" is used in contexts other than employment. 60
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that where the "bonafide occupational
requirement" defence is raised, the interpretation of the exception must be
restrictive so as not to frustrate the overall objects of the Canadian Human
Rights Act.
One of the reasons such legislation has been so described [as being of a special
nature] is that it is often the final refuge of the disadvantaged and the disenfran-
chised. As the last protection of the most vulnerable members of society, excep-
tions to such legislation should be narrowly construed.6 1
The Court in Anvari, once it found discrimination, should have embarked upon
an examination of the bona fides of any justification presented by the Depart-
ment. In the labour context, this has meant that an employer must not only show
that the qualification is imposed in good faith, but that it is also reasonably
necessary to the performance of the job.62 To succeed, the Immigration Depart-
ment would have to show good faith in enacting section 19(1)(a), and a clear
connection between the discrimination practised and some immigration objec-
tive, arguably one which is included in section 3 of the Immigration Act.
The record in Anvari indicates that no evidence was introduced at the Tribunal
upon which Mr. Justice Mahoney, in the Federal Court, could have based his
finding that the blanket discrimination was justified. It appears that Mr. Justice
Mahoney, accepted that Parliament had legislated the discrimination, and that
this alone created a presumption of bona fide justification. One is led to the
inescapable conclusion that the failure to challenge the section directly arises
from the Court's own "impressions" of what constitutes a bonafidejustification.
Arguably, the Court may have believed that it is justifiable to discriminate
against disabled persons because of an anticipated drain on Canadian social
services. In the absence of any evidence, however, such a conclusion could only
derive from the Court's own impressions.
60. Rosin, supra note 24.
61. Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Zurich Insurance Company, [1992] 16 C.H.R.R.
D/255 at 263.
62. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Comm.) v. Saskatoon (City), [1990], 11 C.H.R.R. Deci-
sion/22.
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In Etobicoke, Mr. Justice McIntyre specifically rejected the "impressionistic"
evidence of witnesses that firefighting is a "young man's game", which was
advanced to justify mandatory retirement at age sixty.
In dealing with the question of a mandatory retirement age it would seem that
evidence as to the duties to be performed and the relationship between the aging
process and the safe, efficient performance of those duties would be imperative.
... Where a limitation upon continued employment must depend for its validity
on proof of a danger to public safety by the continuation in employment of peo-
ple over a certain age, it would appear to be necessary in order to discharge the
burden of proof resting upon the employer to adduce evidence upon this subject.
... It seems to me, however, that in cases such as this statistical and medical
evidence based upon observation and research on the question of aging, if not in
all cases absolutely necessary, will certainly be more persuasive ... 63
The Court in Anvari appears to have employed an analytical method which
leaves disabled people in a most vulnerable position, as decisions are easily
influenced by unchallenged myths and stereotypes about the lifestyles and social
contributions of persons with disabilities.
In light of the fact that no evidence was tendered by the Department to justify
the overall discriminatory practice, it is hard to see how the Department could
have discharged the burden of proving "bona fide justification". The mere
expectation that a disabled person might cause demands on health or social
services can hardly be a justification for discrimination, particularly when no
other applicants are screened in the same way, and when no balancing of an
applicant's potential contribution to Canadian society is weighed against those
medical or social costs.
If for some reason, the argument that section 19 of the Immigration Act should
have been overridden in its entirety is not persuasive, then the Court should have
examined whether section 19 had been applied in a manner consistent with the
CHRA. In other words, was the application of the section justified in Mehran
Anvari's case? In Anvari, the medical evidence was the only evidence tendered
by the Department of any bonafide justification. The Tribunal and the Review
Tribunal were correct in weighing this evidence, and their finding that it fell far
short of the strong and compelling evidence required to provide a bona fide
justification, should have been upheld on judicial review.
It is argued that had the law been properly applied by the Federal Court in
Anvari, either by challenging section 19 directly, or by properly assessing bona
fide justification according to the law in the application of section 19, the result
would have been quite different.
63. Etobicoke, supra note 59 at D1784.
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C. Adverse Effects Discrimination
While the Immigration Act discriminates directly against people with disabili-
ties, it does not, on its face, discriminate against people on the basis of race,
religion or national origin. Any complaints in these areas would predictably be
of "adverse effects" discrimination. The Supreme Court in O'Malley has out-
lined the difference:
A distinction must be made between what I would describe as direct discrimina-
tion and the concept already referred to as adverse effect discrimination in con-
nection with employment. Direct discrimination occurs in this connection where
an employer adopts a practice or rule which on its face discriminates on a pro-
hibited ground. For example, "No Catholics or no women or no blacks
employed here." ... On the other hand, there is the concept of adverse effect
discrimination. It arises where an employer for genuine business reasons adopts
a rule or standard which is on its face neutral, and which will apply equally to
all employees, but which has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited ground
on one employee or group of employees in that it imposes, because of some
special characteristic of the employee or group, obligations, penalties, or restric-
tive conditions not imposed on other members of the work force. 64
In Menghani,65 an applicant for an immigrant visa was required to produce
specific papers to prove a fraternal relationship. No other documentation was
acceptable to the Department. The complainant successfully argued that this
amounted to discrimination where it was shown that such papers were not
available in his country of origin. On Judicial Review, the Department argued
that the Applicant had been refused admission on the basis of insufficient
documentation, and that to succeed he had to show that he had been treated
differently as a result of particular characteristics attributed to him because of
his national origin.
In rejecting such a restricted interpretation, the Court approved of the O'Malley
case to find that discrimination:
may be described as the imposition of obligations, penalties or restrictive condi-
tions that result from a policy or practice which is on its face neutral but which
has a disproportionately negative effect on an individual or group because of a
special characteristic of that individual or group 66
64. Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
536 at 551.
65. Supra note 39 at 53.
66. Ibid. at 55.
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VI. REMEDIES AVAILABLE
Section 53(2) of the CHRA provides remedies which are within the power of the
Commission to order if a Tribunal finds discriminatory practices:
(2) If, at the conclusion of its inquiry, a Tribunal finds that the complaint to
which the inquiry relates issubstantiated, it may, subject to subsection (4) and
section 54, make an order against the person found to be engaging or to have
engaged in the discriminatory practice and include in that order any of the fol-
lowing terms that it considers appropriate:
(a) that the person cease the discriminatory practice and, in order to pre-
vent the same or a similar practice from occurring in the future, take mea-
sures, including
(i) adoption of a special program, plan or arrangement referred to in sub-
section 16(1), or
(ii) the making of an application for approval and the implementing of a
plan pursuant to section 17, in consultation with the Commission on the
general purposes of those measures.
(b) that the person make available to the victim of the discriminatory
practice, on the first reasonable occasion, such rights, opportunities or
privileges as, in the opinion of the Tribunal, are being or were denied the
victim as a result of the practice;
(c) that the person compensate the victim, as the Tribunal may consider
proper, for any or all of the wages that the victim was deprived of and for
any expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the discriminatory
practice; and
(d) that the person compensate the victim, as the Tribunal may consider
proper, for any or all additional cost of obtaining alternative goods, ser-
vices, facilities or accommodation and for any expenses incurred by the
victim as a result of the discriminatory practice. 67
The question of available remedies is obviously of paramount importance for
immigration complainants, and could raise some of the most difficult problems.
In Menghani the Federal Court accepted that the Canadian brother could qualify
as a victim with status to bring a complaint under the CHRA. There was also a
finding that the Department of Immigration had engaged in a discriminatory
practice which had an adverse effect upon the complainant, by the insistence on
specific high school papers unavailable in India, to prove the fraternal relation-
ship. The Court, however, found that the remedy ordered, that of processing the
complainant's brother for landing in Canada, was beyond its jurisdiction.68
Section 53(2) of the CHRA permits an order which "makes available to the
victim of the discriminatory practice" certain opportunities or privileges. Mr.
Justice MacKay reasoned that since the introductory words of section 53 speak
67. Supra note 3.
68. Menghani, supra note 39 at 60.
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of "the complaint", that any orders under section 53(2) can only relate to the
complainant.
While the tribunal found that his brother was discriminated against by the
adverse effect discrimination of the practice followed in New York by the visa
officer, no complaint in relation to that discriminatory practice could be dealt
with by the Commission, or by the tribunal, by virtue of section 40(5)(c). Thus,
in my view, there is a statutory bar to an order of the sort here issued. In my
view there is also a general objection to an award of specific relief to one who is
not a complainant under the Act.69
One might equally well argue that the use of the word "victim" in section 53(2),
as opposed to "complainant" is indicative of an intention to allow the Commis-
sion broad latitude in making orders, particularly in situations where there might
have been multiple victims. It is certainly puzzling that the Court would refuse
to apply the same broad definition of "victim" in the remedies section of the
CHRA, particularly in light of specific Supreme Court instructions to the effect
that Human Rights legislation must be given a broad purposive interpretation. 70
The difficulty for the Commission appears to be to find an order which will
redress the harm done to the complainant, without ordering specific relief to one
who is not a complainant, and who could not be. Arguably the problem is
insoluble as it is hard to conceive of a remedy which would redress the harm
done to Mr. Menghani, without also remedying the discrimination against his
brother. Unfortunately, the Federal Court is of no assistance in resolving the
dilemma that they have created, and merely refer the matter back for an
"appropriate order which would make available to Jawahar Menghani the right
or opportunity which was found to be denied to him as a result of the discrimi-
natory practice. '"7 I
In the absence of some very creative thinking about an alternative Order at the
Tribunal level, the implications of the Menghani decision will be profound. If
it stands, the narrow interpretation of who can be a "victim" for the purposes of
remedies would obviously render meaningless any complaints initiated on
issues related to visa or immigrant applications, even if permitted to proceed.
VII. CONCLUSION
Very few immigration complaints have been brought before the Canadian
Human Rights Commission for consideration. A number of factors probably
69. O'Malley, supra note 64 at 546.
70. Ibid.
71. Menghani, supra note 39 at 63.
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contribute to the low numbers, including a lack of familiarity with the CHRA
among immigration lawyers, and more recently the restricted remedies which
the Federal Court has now said are available for complainants. In addition,
lengthy delays are experienced by all complainants in the processing of their
claims, a factor which can have critical effects in the immigration context.
Indeed, in Menghani,72 Mr. Menghani had unfortunately declared bankruptcy
and was no longer in a position to offer a job to his brother by the time the case
was returned to the Tribunal for resolution.
Given the present state of the law, it would indeed be futile in most cases to even
consider commencing an immigration case under the Canadian Human Rights
Act. Despite the promise of section 2 and the parliamentary assurances about its
purpose and intent, it may, by judicial interpretation have become completely
incapable of redressing wrongs in the immigration context. This will remain so
until section 40(a) of CHRA is challenged on constitutional grounds, until a
direct challenge to section 19(1 )(a) of the Immigration Act is mounted under the
CHRA, and until Menghani is overruled and remedies become available.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Department itself is bound and determined to
fight the Commission at every step of the way in any investigation. Their initial
refusal to cooperate in investigations and the repeated challenges to jurisdiction
at the inquiry level and on review, continue to frustrate any honest attempts to
scrutinize departmental policies and practices. Observers are left with the clear
impression that the real extent of discriminatory practices at the Department of
Immigration has yet to be determined, but that, regardless of what those
discriminatory practices might be, the judiciary appears to have granted the
Department the ability to discriminate with impunity.
72. Ibid.
